Fearing Contraception: The Hidden Inequalities to Women’s Liberation.

Alex Sydney Wilkes

The 1960s were an incredible time for women’s liberation due to the roll out of the contraceptive pill. Prior to this, in order to avoid pregnancy, people would use condoms made from animal intestines (Khan et al, 2013), diaphragms, silk and even home remedies such as honey and olive oil (Targonskaya/healthline.com). In the liquid modern there’s a variety of contraceptive choices, for example: the hormonal implant, hormonal IUD, copper IUD, sterilisation (permanent), vasectomy, patches, injections and a range of pills. However, most of these methods can only be used by women, so what once was liberation for women having the power over their bodies and choosing motherhood, can also be seen as a hindrance on having to assume the responsibilities of being the primary contraceptive user. Which can influence their physical well-being, as well as their sense of self.

Contraception’s don’t come without cost. Findings suggest that on average 40.9% of women in need of contraception were not using any methods to avoid pregnancy (Moreira, 2019). Adding that the most prevalent reasons for nonuse were health concerns and infrequent sex. Other research has also found that negative side effects and cultural norms influence contraceptive (or lack of) use and choices (Claringbold, 2019). Due to most methods having a hormonal basis, they can influence a person’s very sense of self. With women using hormonal methods report higher rates of depression (Welling, 2013). The pill can cause changes to self-esteem, libido and cause mood swings. As well as physical risks such as blood clots, breast cancer and strokes (NHS). It’s no wonder women can fear using contraception’s due to the risks, especially when cases such as the Dalkon Shield IUD are a part of our history. A.H. Robins knew about the defects of the string being too thick in 1972 but continued to insert a further one million into women (Byrne, 1992). In 1974 they stopped selling, but by this point they already had a total global sale of approximately 4.5 million (Krismann, 2015). Side effects included pain, uterine perforations, sterility, septic abortion, ectopic pregnancies and in some cases death. In the US alone 209 septic spontaneous abortions were reported (Howand, 1975). As women are still using these methods there’s little motivation for innovation. Contraceptives for women should have continued progression to reduce side effects, distribute more information and support across the world, and non-hormonal methods should be the main focus to prevent women suffering simply because they wish to avoid pregnancy. Furthermore, the use of piloting contraceptives has a darker history to it to. It’s no secret that the original pill was piloted on women with low incomes in Puerto Rico (Warwick, 1975) and without them knowing they were the first to trail the pill. Showing the societal and cultural impact contraceptives have on the history of women’s inequality. Ingraining the fear of contraception into women around the world. Many women find a contraception that works for them, but the unprompted awareness of hormone-free methods causes women to ‘settle’ on a contraceptive that carries higher health risks (Johnson, 2013). It brings the question: why are women allowed to be put through this? In some cases, treated as experimental participants for new contraceptive drugs. Almost expected to accept the potential risks even at the detriment of their sense of self and health.

Future contraception’s show little hope for more male contraception’s due to trails being cut short due to adverse side effects. For instance, acne, change in libido, and mood disorders (Behre, 2016). Which can only reflect the power of the patriarchy and ignorance of the global societal issues surrounding the side effects of women’s contraceptives. This can be seen in real life cases such as the Nelson pill hearing in the 1970s. Stemming from Barbara Seamans book: The doctors case against the pill, the US hearing was made up of all men deciding whether or not the oral pill was safe for women and whether women are given enough information about the possible risks (Gomer, 216). This was met with an empowering protest from American women. Despite the progression of studies in developing safe and effective contraceptives for males, it’s stated that commercialization is not on the horizon (Gava, 2019). It’s shocking that extensive research investigates physical side effects of contraceptives on women, but drifts from understanding the mental health and changes to sense of self. Women should not need to fear contraception due to the possible complications, and therefore research should make them safer, at the same level as male contraceptives are held at. In spite of male vasectomies being less invasive than sterilization and reversable, vasectomy is utilized at less than half the rate of female sterilization (Shih, 2011). Innovation needs to be made in order to make male contraceptives more readily available, as this will help promote a societal change to take the pressure off women to assume the responsibility. As we now largely accept that both parties are responsible for protecting themselves if they wish to avoid pregnancy. Despite acceptance of this, most contraceptives are still designed for women, and still reflects the lack of concern over women’s health in comparison to men’s health.

In a nutshell, contraceptive safety appears to have less concern with regards to women. This can only be a reflection of the history of women inequality, and not been taking seriously (i.e. women hysteria). As well as a reflection of society not deeming the issue important enough to solve, despite decades of research. It’s clear the role of biopower, in these developments giving people control over their bodies. However, throughout history this empowerment for women has also been a hinderance on their overall mental and physical wellbeing. Societal issues surrounding contraceptives highlight the lack of progression in developing better methods for both men and women. Men having less options which means women automatically assume the responsibility. Finally, you can see the underlining patriarchy as poor women in Puerto Rico were used as pilot subjects for the pill without knowing, compared to male trails being cut short due to side effects similar to the ones millions of women are currently suffering.

 

References

Behre, H.M., Zitzmann, M., Anderson, R.A., Handelsman, D.J., Lestori, S.W., Mclachlan, R.I., Meriggiola, M.C., Misro, M.M., Noe, G., Wu, C.W.F., Festin, M.P.A., Habib, N.A., Vogelsong, K.M., Callahan, M.M, Linton, K.A., & Colvard, M. 2016. “Efficacy and safety of an injectable combination hormonal contraceptive for men”, journal of clinical endocrinology and metabolism, 101(12): 4779- 4788

Byrne, K. 1992, “medical records in litigation: the Dalkon shield story”, 32(5): 11-40

Claringbold, L., Sanci, L., & Smith, M.T. 2019, “Factors influencing young women’s contraceptive choices”, royal Australian college of general practitioners, 48(6):389-392

Gava, G., & Meriggiola, M.C. 2019, “Update on male hormonal contraception”, Therapeutic advances in endocrinology and metabolism. Doi:10.1177/2042018819834846

Gomer, K., & Marrs, C. 2016, “Nelson pill hearing annotated”, doi:10.13140/RG.2.2.32749.64489

Howard, J., Tatum, M.D., Frederick, H., Schmudt, M.A., Phillips, D., McCarty, M., & O’Leary, W.M. 1975, “ The Dalkon shield controversy: structural and bacteriological studies of IUD trails”, 231 (7): 711-717

Johnson, S., Pion, C., & Jenning, V. 2013, “Current methods and attitudes of women towards contraception in Europe and America”, reproductive health 10(7)

Khan, F., Mukhtar, S., Dickinson, I.K. & Spiprasad, S., 2012, “The story of the condom”, Journal of the urological society of India, 29(1):12-15

Krisman, C.H., Bhutia, T.K., & Petruziello, M. 2015, “Dalkon shield: birth control device”

Mazz, D., Harrison, C., & Taf, T. 2012, “Current contraceptive management in Australian general practice: An analysis of BEACH data”, medical journal of Australia 192(2):110-140

Moreira, L.R., Ewerling, F., Barros, A.J.P., & Silveira, M.F. 2019, “Reasons for nonuse of contraceptive methods by women with demand for contraception not satisfied: An assessment of low and middle-income countries using demographic and health surveys”, reproductive health 16(148)

Mueller, R.D. 1989, “Psychosocial consequences to women of contraceptive use and controlled fertility”, health issues for women and children. National academic press.

NHS: https://www.nhs.uk/conditions/contraception/?tabname=worries-and-questions

Shih, G., Turok, D.K., Parker, W.J. 2011, “Vasectomy: the other (better) form of sterilization”, contraceptive journal 83(4):310-315

Targonskaya, A. “Ancient birth control methods: how did women prevent pregnancy throughout the ages?”. Weblink: https://www.healthline.com/health/birth-control/herbal-birth-control#1

Wainer, J. 1981, “why women don’t use contraception”. Weblink: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/m/pubmed/12263457

Warwick, D. 1975, “Contraceptive in the third world”, the Hastings centre repot 5(4):9-12. Doi:10.2307/3561416

Welling, L.L.M. 2013, “Psychobehavioural effects of hormonal contraceptive use”, evolutionary psychology 11(3):718-742

Is Happiness a Natural or a Human Kind?

David Gardiner-Mcgregor

Psychology “is produced by, produces, and is an instance of, its own subject matter” (Richards, 1996, p. 5).

The concept of natural and human kinds is essential to the study of psychology because as the field develops we increasingly think about ourselves in relation to the new concepts and categories presented to us. Concepts such as happiness, depression and intelligence do not exist innately and so cannot be said to be natural kinds for their existence requires the descriptions and the discourses provided by psychology (Brinkmann, 2005). As human kinds, these concepts are interdependent on the categories that they exist within and their descriptions, creating a looping effect (Hacking, 1995b). Hacking refers to human kinds as moving targets as once we begin to identify factors, we interact with the targets of our investigations thereby changing them (Hacking, 2006). Unlike the natural sciences, psychology has the power to transform its subject matter: “you cannot know without transforming” (Foucault, 1998, p. 255).

Everyone wants to be happy, and in my opinion we all try to increase our happiness daily by engaging in pleasurable activities e.g. spending time with loved ones. Some would argue that happiness is simply an abundance of sensory pleasure over sensory pain. On the surface this is a sound description, until we consider contradictory examples. Fred Feldman in his book What is This Thing called Happiness (2010) offers a woman who is giving birth. She will be experiencing more sensory pain than pleasure but then would reasonably describe the overall experience as one of the happiest moments of her life. So then, what is happiness?  Well-being and happiness are synonymous, and a person deemed to be happy can be described as a “young, healthy, well-educated, well-paid, extroverted, optimistic, worry-free, religious, married person with high-self-esteem, high job morale, modest aspirations, of either sex and of a wide range of intelligence” (Wilson, 1967, p. 294).  This is the highest form of happiness according to Aristotle, characterised as being produced by a contemplative life. The reflexivity required to contemplate one’s own life regards happiness as a human kind. Life is complex, and my life is incredibly different from those around me in so many ways that any account I could give for my own happiness would be subjective. Thus, the outlook on the circumstances and experiences of one’s life are what determine happiness, such that a king, with all his riches, can be unhappy due to the weight of responsibility upon his shoulders versus a pauper who finds happiness within his community despite living in poverty.

However, the internal feeling of happiness must have a biological basis, as all emotions do, and research has shown that ultimately it is a genetic factor (Badcock, 2010). Thinkers such as Darwin recognised that human beings operate by guarding against ‘evil’ by means of pain and suffering and by seeking out pleasurable sensations which stimulate us to action (The Life and Letters of Charles Darwin, 1887). Therefore, through natural selection, pleasure has developed as a guide to improve our habits. Research by De Neve, Fowler and Frey (2012) identified a single gene as responsible for our baseline levels of happiness, the serotonin transporter gene 5HTT, and those with more efficient versions report higher levels of life satisfaction. A direct linear relationship was found, demonstrating that this gene is responsible for our respective well-being. Without this gene happiness would not be a concept just as if the H2O molecule did not exist, we would have nothing to which we ascribe the notion of water as a natural kind. It wouldn’t exist, and neither would happiness without 5HTT and other corresponding genes.

But given that happiness is based in biology, does that make it a natural kind? It would be easy for people to assume that it is based on this evidence, however, it is argued that no natural kinds exist within psychology (Collin, 1990). If we were to fully map the neural substrates of happiness, we could not say that we have identified the natural kind, or ‘essence’, of happiness. What if we were to find a planet just like earth in every respect whose inhabitants experienced happiness as phenomenologically indistinguishable from our own, differing only in its neuronal structure? Although describing them as ‘happy’ would be correct, their neuronal structure would resemble, say, depressed people on earth. Thus we would have to conclude that it is not happiness, but simply resembled it (Putnam, 1973). This demonstrates the discrepancies of psychology and other social sciences against the natural sciences because there is no natural kind for happiness as with, for instance, water, whose underlying essence is its molecular structure (H2O). Happiness lacks this essence which secures the meaning of the concept, but instead meaning is attached to the behaviours we observe in happy individuals, and to the significance within our world (Badcock, 2010).

The development of these human kinds is undoubtedly a positive in psychology as they allow for the divergence of discourse through categorization. This flexibility of thought permits cooperation with social authorities i.e. the study of happiness from a biological and evolutionary psychological perspective is limiting when we consider the benefits of moving beyond the limits of biology by incorporating cultural and historical psychological perspectives. In the end this is what grants us the ability to determine what happiness is for ourselves. Many people seek to increase their own happiness manually through social activities such as social media engagement. I have noticed the effects of social media in my own life and how social comparisons have negatively affected my well-being by increasing anxiety. By neglecting my social media accounts for several months, I took the necessary steps to prevent this and I noticed a rise in my overall contentment with myself and with my life. Chae (2018) examined the relationship between social media and happiness and found that we often socially compare ourselves to our peers, believing that they have better lives than us and are therefore happier but concluded that without this social comparison, social media could make us happier. This highlights that our happiness is determined by ourselves and the activities in which we choose to participate. Nordengren (2012) posits that the happiest among us are those who continually participate with the world, engaging in difficult activities which require a high level of skill. Personal action allows us to find the key to happiness by engaging more frequently in what Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi calls ‘flow’ activities (Flow: The Psychology of Optimal Experience, 1991).  This is the looping effect to which Hacking (1995b) refers, as once we have identified the properties of happiness and determined the factors that effect it, then we can interact to manipulate our own happiness.

Overall, I believe that happiness is demonstrated to be a human kind as there is no fundamental essence that defines the basis for happiness as there are with natural kinds. Despite its biological basis (De Neve, Fowler & Frey, 2012) it exists as a description of the experiences within human social life, and as such it is open to manipulation and is subjective in nature. Therefore, like other psychological categories, it can be transformed through mere knowledge acquisition and category formation, allowing individuals to define happiness for themselves and change accordingly.

 

References

Badcock, C. (2010). Happiness: ultimately it’s genetic! 17th March. Psychology Today. [Online] [Accessed on 1st March 2019] https://www.psychologytoday.com/intl/blog/the-imprinted-brain/201005/happiness-ultimately-its-genetic?amp.

Brinkmann, S. (2005). ‘Human kinds and looping effects in psychology: Foucauldian and hermeneutic perspectives’. Theory & Psychology15(6), pp.769-791.

Chae, J. (2018). ‘Re-examining the relationship between social media and happiness: The effects of various social media platforms on reconceptualized happiness’. Telematics and Informatics, 35(6), pp. 1656-1164.

Collin, F. (1990). ‘Naturlige klasser, semantik og metode i samfundsvidenskaberne [Natural kinds, semantics, and method in the social sciences]’. Filosofiske Studier, 11, pp. 7–24.

Csikszentmihalyi, M. (1991). Flow: The Psychology of Optimal Experience. New York: Harper Perennial.

Darwin, F. (1887). The Life and Letters of Charles Darwin. London: John Murray

De Neve, J.E., Christakis, N.A., Fowler, J.H. & Frey, B.S. (2012). ‘Genes, economics, and happiness’. Journal of Neuroscience, Psychology, and Economics5(4), pp. 193-211.

Eysenck, M. W. (1990) Happiness: facts and myths. Michigan: Erlbaum.

Feldman, F. (2010). What is This Thing Called Happiness? Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Foucault, M. (1998). Essential works of Foucault: Vol. 2. Aesthetics, method, and epistemology. New York: New Press.

Hacking, I. (1995b). ‘The looping effect of human kinds’. Causal cognition: A multidisciplinary debate, pp. 351-394.

Hacking, I. (2006). ‘Kinds of People: Moving Targets’. Proceedings of the British Academy, 151, pp. 285-317.

Nordengren, C. (2012). The subjectivity of happiness: on Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi’s ‘Flow’ 5th January. National Catholic Reporter. [Online] [Accessed 2nd March 2019] https://www.ncronline.org/blogs/young-voices/subjectivity-happiness-mihaly-csikszentmihalyis-flow.

Putnam, H. (1973). ‘Meaning and reference’. Journal of Philosophy, 70, pp. 699–711.

Richards, G. (1996). Putting psychology in its place: An introduction from a critical historical perspective. London: Routledge.

Wilson, W. (1967). ‘Correlates of avowed happiness’. Psychological Bulletin, 67, pp. 294-306.

 

The influence of Neoliberalism on Sexuality in a changing Modernity

Eric Andrew Mcnamara

The emergence and increasing influence of neoliberalism has gone almost overlooked by millennials, including myself; If not for deciding to study psychology at university, I wouldn’t have been introduced to the ideology of neoliberalism, and the impact it has had on my life. Neoliberalism aims to improve social conditions concerning the free autonomous self, a subjective form of traditional liberalism; here individuals are given power and play an important role in their own self-government (Hamann, 2009). The sexologist and theorist Volkmar Sigusch argues that this neoliberal restructuring enabled the flexibilization of sexual and gender norms; I believe this restructuring also allowed for the flexibilization of sexuality and gender.

Under neoliberalism the regulation of sexuality is aiming for an increase in freedom and tolerance; same-sex partnerships are now legal, heteronormative politics are more flexible, and same-sex lifestyles are no longer criminalised (Gundula, 2016). This influence neoliberalism has had on sexuality has enabled me to express myself more freely and empowered me to own my sexuality; providing me with opportunities I would not have had a few years ago; opportunities such as same-sex marriages which was legalised in England and Wales in July 2013.

However, opportunities like same-sex marriages have taken longer to be legalised in other countries. In the United States same-sex marriages didn’t become legal universally until 2015, and even then, the majority of the states are still against same-sex unions. This is due to the influence of culture, discourse and power has on people’s perceptions. This discursive power plays a serious role in restricting and constructing individual’s lives and identity through social power (Green, 2007). A highly influential discourse that uses social power in the US are religious institutions. These religious institutions influence attitudes and perceptions towards sexuality and aid in how individuals construct sexual norms into their own self-conceptions. Sherkat et al., (2011) states that having strong religious beliefs are associated with unapproving views on same-sex unions and same-sex rights. Highlighting that even though there is a more accepting neoliberal sexuality identification by legalising same-sex marriages in the US, discourses like religious institutions can negatively impact individual’s sexual identity by living in those states that are still against same-sex unions.

The appearance of neoliberalism has often been viewed as an outcome of the Fordism crisis in the early 1970’s (Walks, 2015), moving from a solid to a more liquid modernity. As an ideology Fordism has impacted the expression of sexuality until the emergence of neoliberalism. This change from the solid modernity of the Fordist workforce were sexuality was viewed as the other to work, and sexual drive had to be sublimated through work; neoliberalism emerged creating a more liquid modernity, were sexual drive was meant to be domesticated to use as an exploitable resource (Woltersdorff, 2011). As a result, sexual markets appeared in order to exploit these sexual desires and neosexualities.

Pollak (1985) made an observation that the gay scene can be described as a market in which sexual practices are exchanged, with a market value measured in orgasms. This resonates with me as the Manchester gay scene can be depicted in Pollak’s observation. Sexuality and sexual desires have been empowered and freely expressed within the gay community in Manchester; sexuality being used as an exploitable resource in an increasing sexual market. It demonstrates this as more people are opting for non-monogamous relationships, polyamorous relationships, or just causal cruising. Whilst I am thankful for neoliberalism allowing for a more accepting and empowering expression of sexuality, I am torn with how it has made sexuality an exploitable resource to the extent of it becoming impersonal.

Nevertheless, as these sexual markets transform technology adapts alongside, further empowering neoliberal sexuality. The internet has provided a community for sexual exchange, diverse sexual interests and differentiation in sexual practices (Woltersdorff, 2011), in forms of online dating apps and virtual cruising (Pollak, 1985). In a time of liquid modernity, finding and maintaining a relationship is less steady than those from solid modernity; therefore, personally using these new online dating platforms enables me to refine my search for someone wanting the same. The fluidity of everyday life in late-stage modernity has created new possibilities of reflexive ‘pure relationships’, that is accessible to everyone and breaks open traditional limitations on social norms (Giddens, 1993). Friends of mine also use more casual cruising apps for as a resource to express and use their sexuality as a more exploitable resource, providing a place for sexual liberation and sexual pleasure. As Bauman (2003) expressed, it’s the era of ‘liquid love’, were intimacy is a commodity and meaningful relationships are substituted with quick encounters. Illustrating that neoliberalism has edged into mine and others more private life and sexuality.

In a society that is embracing neoliberalism more and more without even realising it, moving from a solid to a more liquid modernity, those of us who desire to have a more solid modernity monogamous relationship find it difficult to embrace this transition. When interviewed by Hüetlin and Voigt (2011) about despite the changes from solid to liquid modernity individuals still chose to have monogamous relationships, Sigusch replied that:

Because it’s the most compatible with out spiritual origins. Father, mother, small family – that’s the way we’ve developed our souls, the way we’ve become, and the way we feel safe, protected and loved. (Hüetlin and Voigt, 2011:Online)

This quote from Sigusch describes a relationship in a solid modernity. The words ‘Father, mother, small family’ conceptualised the idea of a nuclear family that was idealised when in a solid modernity. But as we move into a more liquid modernity this idealised relationship begins to change, and with sexuality being embraced boundaries are broken open. The cliché thought of a family being a father, mother and small family, opened up to variations that include same-sex partners with families.

In conclusion, neoliberalism has impacted sexuality by increasing freedom and tolerance; influencing legislation and laws such as same sex partnerships and lifestyles. This neoliberal restructuring enabled the flexibilization of sexuality and gender, which empowers individuals to own their sexuality and provides them with opportunities those from solid modernity didn’t have. Even so, I think the rise of neoliberalism has caused issues for those who are more traditionally valued as sexuality and sexual desire has become an impersonal exploitable resource in a sexual market. We need to find a way to adapt in a more liquid modernity and consider how others as individuals are affected, as in neoliberalism people are in it for themselves and I believe people should always consider how their actions impact others.

 

References

Bauman, Z. (2003). Liquid Love: On the Frailty of Human Bonds. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Giddens, A. (1993). The Transformation of Intimacy: Sexuality, Love and Eroticism in Modern Societies. London: Polity Press.

Green, A. I. (2007). ‘Queer theory and sociology: Locating the subject and the self in sexualities studies.’ Sociological Theory. 25(1), pp. 26-45.

Gundula, L. (2016). ‘Desiring Neoliberalism.’ Sexuality research & social policy. 13(4), pp. 417-427.

Hamann, T. H. (2009). ‘Neoliberalism, Governmentality and Ethics.’ Foucault Studies. 6, pp. 37-59.

Hüetlin, T. & Voigt, C. (2011). ‘Sexologist Volkmar Sigusch: ‘Our Society is Still Ignorant about Sex’’. Spiegel Online. [Online] 11th March. [Accessed on 2nd March 2019] http://www.spiegel.de/international/zeitgeist/sexologist-volkmar-sigusch-our-society-is-still-ignorant-about-sex-a-748632.html

Sherkat, D. E., Powell-Williams, M., Maddox, G., & de Vries, K. M. (2011). ‘Religion, politics, and support for same-sex marriage in the United States, 1988-2008.’ Social Science Research. 40(1), pp. 167-180. DOI: 10.1016/j.ssresearch.2010.08.009

Walks, A. (2015). ‘Stopping the ‘War on the Car’: Neoliberalism, Fordism, and the Politics of Automobility in Toronto.’ Mobility. [Online] ‘Published online’ published 14th March 2014. [Accessed on 15th February 2019] DOI: 10.1080/17450101.2014.880563

Woltersdorff, V. (2011). ‘Paradoxes of precarious sexualities.’ Sexual subcultures under neo-liberalism. 25(2), pp. 164-182. DOI: 10.1080/09502386.2011.535984

 

 

The Reflexive Relay

Rhian Fawcett
The Reflexive Relay is intended to be a space for those bitten by the critical psychology bug. As our tagline suggests, we want to take back concepts of modernity from the social sciences (such as Psychology, Sociology, History and Philosophy) and hand them those who are actually experiencing those phenomena. We hope that the blog will be contributed to, as well as read by, undergraduates, graduates, academics and interested laypeople alike.

As anyone interested in the issues of psychology will know, the critical life is not an easy one. Once you start spotting the neoliberal agenda of every sitcom and newscast, you know you’re in deep. So, for something to relate to, here are The Five Stages of CHIP.

1. Denial

On learning of a critical concept which promises to unveil some huge misconception, let’s face it, most of us are sceptical.

2. Awakening

Then in the middle of the night it hits you, it all joins together in your head. You feel as though you may have just entered the Matrix.

3. The Critical Lens

After stage two, you cannot escape your discovery. The critical concept has provided a loose thread with which you can’t help but unravel your entire understanding of your world.

4. Social Isolation

By stage three you are delivering informal lectures on said concept to your nearest and dearest (even if they ask you not to). Your failure to take your friends past Stage One without being written off as a conspiracy theorist leaves you lonely.

5. Acceptance

At the end of it all, the critic must accept their fate. Sure, you may never again discuss mental health without spotting the metaphors, or entertain ideas of psychology being a ‘science’: but you will at least find comfort in being part of a community. Whilst I was at university, the CHIP community felt like an insightful, exciting and slightly anarchic place to be. This blog will hopefully help open up that atmosphere to people at all stages of their own critical journey.

Rhian Fawcett established The Reflexive Relay in December 2015 to facilitate inter-cohort conversation between students of contemporary, critical and historical issues in psychology. It is maintained by Geoff Bunn at Manchester Metropolitan University.

Biopower and Pre-Marital Genetic Screening

Eli Kasmir

Growing up in an Orthodox Jewish community, I have been accustomed to its beliefs, behaviours and societal norms. One of the practices that I have found challenging from engaging on the CHIP unit, is the concept of Genetic Screening. Eligible bachelors and bachelorettes have a blood test organised by a global Jewish charity called Dor Yesharim, Committee for Prevention of Jewish Genetic Diseases. This sample is then analysed by geneticists in search of recessive traits that cause life-threatening disorders. This data is then used when matchmaking a Jewish couple. Prior to dating, a genetic compatibility test is conducted to see whether the couple are a suitable genetic match. Its key aim is the elimination of common genetic debilitating disorders prevalent within Jewish people. As a teenager, I underwent this test with little appreciation. However, studying on this unit has given me an awareness of the positive and negative aspects of this test, thus shaping my political stance.

Biopower is “an explosion of numerous and diverse techniques for achieving the subjugation of bodies and the control of populations,” (Foucault, 1978, 140). In other words, it is a technology of power that aims to improve a human group or population by transforming its biological qualities.

Rabinow and Rose (2006) state that biopower consists of three components: (1) a ‘truth’ about the character of humans, (2) strategies of intervention upon the health of the population, (3) conditions of subjectification that allow individuals to work on themselves in accordance to the ‘truth’ of humans. Since pre-marital genetic testing aligns with these elements, I believe it is a form of biopower.

My decision to engage with these services was influenced by my social environment. I came across the organisation since their ‘ambassadors’ were sent into my school. In Foucault’s opinion, Dor Yesharim and my school acted as the state, in an attempt to regulate heredity and risk (Foucault, 1982). Moreover, the behaviours of the community suggest that pre-marital genetic testing is a form Foucauldian-style governmentality (Trawick, 2001). The scientific knowledge underpinning the practices of pre-marital genetic testing established a norm (McWhorter, 2009), pertinent to continuity of the population, as a way of reducing certain genetically deviant normalities in relation to the desirably “fit” characteristics (Davidson, 2009).

Whilst I appreciate these practices appear to relate to Michel Foucault’s analysis of biopower, I believe that they differ in the way in which they have shifted from the state to individual decision-makers (Trawick, 2001). Whilst my community, school and family, encouraged me to have the blood test, the choice to make, was at my discretion. Thereby inherently suggesting that preliminary ideas about biopower are considerably outdated and ought to be updated with regard to technological advancements made within the geneticised era, as well as the emergence of neo-liberalism, thus laying in support of a neoliberal governmentality (Rose, 1999).

Biopower can come across as a ‘pastoral’ force, with the vested interest of the success of the population at heart (Lilja and Vinthagen, 2014). I remember being in awe of the organisation when they came to our school. Their charismatic leadership left me and my classmates under the illusion that undergoing this test was unquestionable and was in the best interest of ourselves, thus laying in support of this idea.

Prior to engaging on this unit, as well preparing my reflexive journal, I had little appreciation of the gravity of pre-marital genetic testing. I held the political view that genetic testing, modification and enhancement was a positive force. I believe that this was shaped by my strong religious and political views regarding anti-abortion and the geneticist’s argument in favour of giving children future health benefits that would otherwise go on to live a life filled with physical adversities (Stock and Campbell, 2000). However, studying on this course has challenged my political views.

Learning about biopower gave me an awareness of the awkwardness applying these principles can have. We now live in the age of the technology revolution with medical advancements on the rise. Diseases that were incurable fifty years ago can now be treated, with those same individuals going on to live a wonderful life. One of my friends has cystic fibrosis, if her parents would have undergone the genetic test she may not have been born. Whilst she has experienced physical difficulties, she is an extremely kind individual who is always helping others.  For me, this poses several ethical dilemmas: How can states be at liberty to decide and impose what genetic components are deemed as desirable and will improve ones’ life? At what point, does humanity draw the line? Is the usage of pre-marital genetic testing a form of discrimination?  Could this lead to a pre-marital geneticised holocaust?

Having reflected on my own experiences engaging with biopower I can conclude that the debate around biopower is that of a highly subjective ethical one. Foucault claimed that “people have to build their own ethics” (Rabinow, 1997, 132), thus implying that discourses and information can serve as tools for a specific topic, however, people must formulate their own ethos through exercising their freedom. In my opinion, this quote encapsulates the statement of the problem, whilst also alluding to the recognisable solution. On paper biopower can appear to be the answer to the problem. However, I believe that organisations like Dor Yesharim become so fixated on its aims and objectives, it fails to consider the ethical debate surrounding pre-marital genetic testing. I no longer believe that genetic screening and enhancement are solely positive potent forces. Rather, they are techniques that are assumed to better the sake of humanity. Subsequently, if their implications are not considered they can have detrimental impacts on society.

 

References

Davidson, A. (ed.) (2009). Security, territory, population: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1937 – 1974. New York: Palgrave.

Foucault, M. (1978). The History of Sexuality, Volume 1: An Introduction. Trans. Robert Hurley. New York: Vintage Books.

Foucault, M. (1982). ‘The subject and power.’ Critical Inquiry, 8(4) pp. 777 – 795.

Lilja, M. and Vinthagen, S. (2014). ‘Sovereign power, disciplinary power and biopower: resisting what power with what resistance?’ Journal of Political Power, 7(1) pp. 107 – 126.

McWhorter, L. (2009). ‘Governmentality, biopower, and the debate over genetic enhancement.’ Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 34(4) 409 – 437.

Rabinow, P. (ed.) (1997). Michel Foucault: Ethics, subjectivity, and truth: The Essential works of Foucault, 1954 – 1984: Volume I. New York: The New Press.

Rabinow, P. and Rose, N. (2006). ‘Biopower today.’ BioSocieties, 1(2) pp. 195 – 217.

Rose, N. (1999). Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Stock, G., and Campbell, J., (eds.) (2000). Engineering the human germline: An exploration of the science and ethics of altering the genes we use to pass to our children. New York: Oxford University Press.

Trawick, R. J. (2001). Neo-Liberal eugenics? Prenatal testing and the “insourcing” of biopolitics. BA (Hon.) The University of Victoria.

When Place Becomes Territory: Understanding Shared Meaning of Space and Football Hooliganism

George Franklin

 

We have a family friend, a lovely man whom I have known for a good portion of my life. He is not heavily involved in our lives, but would often come round with his wife and dog for dinner or a couple of drinks of an evening with my parents. I was frankly shocked to discover only years ago had he given up being a football hooligan, something he overtly admitted he enjoyed doing, something he took great pride in doing. Aside from the fact that it was for the direct rival of the club I support, I could never quite understand it. As a passionate fan myself, I never liked coining the phrase “It’s just a game”, because it simply is not, it means so much than that. Its apart of your very identity, it is a collective identity, it is a religious system, it’s a shared space, shared values. Therefore, I tried to understand his behaviour, and the morality of it I could not, I could never justify, or even attempt to understand the resorting to violent acts to display passion or emotion, but I could attempt to understand why this happened, and why it happened regularly across the continent for a plethora or different clubs that existed in different social and historical contexts.

A brief conversation I elicited with him since discovering his past I found fascinating. He told me of a time whereby they would openly converse with away fans about a destination, usually parks or certain streets close to the stadium to which they could meet and engage in prolonged physical violence before the match. These areas would hold little value during the week, or when the season was over, or to other people who walk and used their functions daily. Nevertheless, on match days, they became poignant and powerful, and he told me about how it brought people together all for the wrong reasons. This got me initially thinking about whether the place these people meet are important in understanding their behaviours. Therefore, I found it most fascinating and applicable to attempt to understand football violence through psychogeography and particularly elements such as place making and topophilia, the cultural and social understanding of territorial identity (Oliveria et al, 2010). Spaces, once they have gained subjective meaning, become places, and with places come strong senses of belonging and identity, both on local and national levels (Morley, 2011). It is this idea, born out of passionate tribal like following that I believed gave birth and prolongs football hooliganism.

Football teams are often regarded as representational icons of not just surrounding spaces, but sometimes-entire cities and areas (Van Houtum et al, 2002). This can be seen with examples routed in social class and identity, with Sheffield United, a town famous for its Steel Production proudly nicknamed “The Blades”, demonstrating an intangible link the space the football club occupies and its applied historical meaning (Mainwaring & Clark, 2012). Literature would suggest that attributing social meaning to a place could provide it with territorial rules, meaning there are strict perceptions about what appears in or out of place within a particular space, inciting elements of power (Sack, 1993). The meaning attributed to that particular place can only be conceived out of public meaning, and in the case of football hooliganism, particularly in two team cities, it becomes a contestation of space, with different groups attempting to apply their meaning or sense of belonging onto a particular space, thus making it territorial (Giulianotti & Armstrong, 2002). This idea is supported by historical accounts, that suggested that many younger hooligans of clubs would regard areas surrounding the stadium as home turf, something that needs to be defended against outsiders, as the space they are defending simply is not just a space regarded as ontological fact, it harbours significant social meanings attributed to the club and thus their personal identities (Spaaij, 2008 & Lefebvre, 1991). Further discursive studies point toward territorial spaces, shared and contradictory meaning being the driving point for violence, with the word ‘stadium’ being favoured to ‘ground’, ‘ground’ something more associated with spatial contestation (Bale, 2000). I therefore found myself thinking about whether I experience this, on a lesser level than my family friend, but having attended football matches since I was around five you do feel a deep routed connection to the space surrounding the stadium, a sense of belonging and that on match days you are there to defend and promote the wellbeing of the team to the detriment of the opposition.

However, there is a critical element to the literature. There is the argument that it may be attribution of meaning toward physical space that promotes these violent acts, but from my experience of supporting football clubs, the instigation of online and physical violence tends to stem from Foucault’s idea of ‘Heterotopic Spaces’, that they are intense, incompatible and often contradictory, and that football fans are constantly attempting to apply their meanings to these theoretical spaces (Evans & Norcliffe, 2016). This is further extended with historical contexts offering the view that territory and the idea of space can exist in a metaphorical or rhetorical sense, the physical domain does not have to exist for the effect to present (Brenner & Elden, 2009; Morley, 2011). Again, when having this curious conversation, he mentioned the fact that a lot of it has moved away from displaying acts of physicality into the realms of trolling and social media, something he offset his engagement with due to his age. It is my belief through engaging with football fans on social media, and observing often-heated exchanges that historically would have been fought on physical plains and spaces, is now being fought in rhetorical spaces, but to the same degree of endeavour and fury than in the past.

 

References

Bale, J. (2000). The Changing Face of Football: Stadiums and Communities. Soccer and Society, 1(1), 91-101.

Brenner, N., & Elden, S. (2009). Henri Lefebvre on State, Space, Territory. International Political Sociology, 3(4), 353-377.

Evans, D., & Norcliffe, G. (2016). Local identities in a global game: the social production of football space in Liverpool. Journal of Sport & Tourism, 20(3-4), 217-232.

Giulianotti, R., & Armstrong, G. (2002). Avenues of contestation. Football hooligans running and ruling urban spaces. Social Anthropology, 10(2), 211-238.

Mainwaring, E., & Clark, T. (2012). ‘We’re shit and we know we are’: identity, place and ontological security in lower league football in England. Soccer & Society, 13(1), 107-123.

Morley, D. (2001). Belongings: Place, space and identity in a mediated world. European journal of cultural studies, 4(4), 425-448.

Lefebvre, H. (1991). The production of space. Oxford, UK: Blackwell.

Oliveira, J., Roca, Z., & Leitão, N. (2010). Territorial identity and development: From Topophilia to Terraphilia. Land use policy, 27(3), 801-814.

Sack, R. D. (1993). The power of place and space. Geographical Review, 83(3), 326-329.

Spaaij, R. (2008). Men Like Us, Boys Like Them: Violence, Masculinity, and Collective Identity in Football Hooliganism. Journal of Sport and Social Issues, 32(4), 369–392.

Van Houtum, H., & Van Dam, F. (2002). Topophilia or topoporno? Patriotic place attachment in international football derbies. International Social Science Review, 3(2), 231-248.

‘Green, Safe and Inclusive’*

Paige Livingstone

 

Milton Keynes (MK) was built in 1967, making it 52 years old. It’s the proud owner of more than 300 roundabouts (BBC4, 2017). Due to the roads being built in a grid system you literally cannot drive more than a kilometer without reaching a roundabout. MK is also famous for its concrete cows – such an ‘oasis of tarmac’ (BBC4, 2017:6min 39) is MK that we even had to construct our own wildlife. It’s exactly the kind of place that the Situationists of the 1950s and 1960s would have hated.

The Situationists were a group based in Paris who criticised the gentrification of urban spaces in capitalist societies (Bridger, 2013). They called for the recognition of cities as places for imagination, exploration and co-operation . They recognised the need for cities that welcome lively culture rather than rigidly designed spaces (Pyyry, 2018). The manufactured, industrial, cookie cutter impression that I have of my hometown is something I believe the Situatonists felt of their own urban areas. MK is exactly the kind of place the Situationists rebelled against – a meticulously planned and constructed city, everything in its place and nothing without a purpose. The Milton Keynes Development Corporation set out to build a utopia (BBC4, 2017), but my experience was far from one of someone living in utopia. There is nothing unique or different in MK. There are no independent cafes, clothing shops, restaurants or other shops. I didn’t realise how much of this I missed as I was growing up, but moving to Manchester, where the culture and history of the city feels ever present and clearly has influenced every corner of this place has cast the soullessness of MK into harsh daylight. MK was rigidly designed, intended for practicality and ease of use.

Partly because it was built so recently and partly because of the layout of the place, being in Milton Keynes makes you feel is if you’re standing in a place devoid of culture. The Milton Keynes Development Corporation oversaw the planning and development of MK up until 1992 (BBC4, 2017). They did consider culture creation when designing the city, stating ‘you can’t build a city just of houses and factories and shops’ (BBC4, 2017:20min 36). They were self aware at least, but slapping artistic sculptures around the city does not a culture make.

My experience of growing up in MK has led me to associate these negative feelings with the city and develop harsh and critical opinions towards it. It has become a “place” to me rather than a “space” – the difference between the two being that a “space” is a generic description of a physical area, whereas a “place” is something that holds personal meaning for a person (Cresswell, 2004). Of course MK is a place to me, I would defy anyone to view their hometown, the space in which they were born, developed and grew up, as anything but a place. And although I do have many negative opinions about MK, I am also very defensive of it – as if I am allowed to critique it, but no one else is. There are also parts of MK that I appreciate. For the first nineteen years of my life I lived in Bletchley, more specifically a ten minute walk away from Bletchley Park, a place of huge historical significance. It makes me proud to be able to say that I lived there, despite having only properly visited Bletchley Park a small handful of times. There is definitely only one Bletchley Park in the world, so perhaps it’s not fair to say that there is nothing in MK that is unique.

I’ve also come to appreciate what MK represented to its residents when it was first built, reminding me of how subjective and personal the placemaking experience is. Pink (2008) suggested that sharing an ethnographic psychogeographical experience and attuning yourself to another can help to see the world the way that they do. I have managed to do this without having to leave my own home in Manchester. What I didn’t know before preparing for this essay was that back in the 70s and 80s the residents of the housing estates created collaborative pieces of artwork in order to forge a sense of community (BBC4, 2017). I used to pass these housing estates in my mum’s car, and later explored them more when I started learning to drive myself. They are so familiar to me and so are my opinions of them, and yet imagining the first settlers coming together and creating together makes me feel something new and different about these places. People moved to MK from London in search of green spaces, fresh air and a better quality of life (BBC4, 2017). The Open University was established in MK, which offers advanced learning to everyone, opened at a time when higher education was a privilege of the middle class (BBC4, 2017). This is an opportunity that I feel proud came from my hometown and an opportunity that many people in my life have taken advantage of where traditional university courses wouldn’t have been an option.

There are more than 22 million trees in MK (far outnumbering the roundabouts), and every new family was given one to plant when they moved (BBC4, 2017). Green space has been associated with many mental health benefits including reduced stress [Beyer, 2014] and decreased anxiety (Nutsford et al., 2013). MK is also home to the first Buddhist Peace Pagoda in the Western World (BBC4, 2017), and I run past it every time I go home and do a parkrun. I’ve experienced through this research and these revelations a feeling of placemaking from a distance – a phenomenon that, when conducting research, I found no reference to in the literature. I’ve tempered my own less than ideal experience and opinion of MK with an appreciation of what it represented for those who moved there in its formative years, and the spaces I so often ignored like the Peace Pagoda or the Open University have become places to me almost retroactively and from afar.

When I first planned this essay and started my research, the direction I imagined and planned I would take ended up being very different to the end result. Originally my title for this essay was going to be “The Situationists Would Have Hated Milton Keynes”, but halfway through I realised that that was no longer an accurate reflection of my placemaking experience. I was ready to tear my hometown apart, criticise its lack of soul and manufactured nature. To an extent I do still believe this, but in researching MK I’ve come to appreciate it from a perspective outside of my own. I’ve come to realise what it represented for the people who first moved there in the early seventies. My views on MK are a lot more nuanced than before I started writing and researching for this essay, which I believe is the whole point of reflexive writing.

References

*BBC4. (2017) Milton Keynes and Me [Online Video] [Accessed 25 Feb 2019]
https://learningonscreen.ac.uk/ondemand/index.php/prog/0F7FD6A6?bcast=124829996

Beyer, K.M.M. et al. (2014) ‘Exposure to neighborhood green space and mental health: evidence from the survey of the health of Wisconsin.’ International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health , 11(3), pp.3453–3472.

Bridger, A.J. (2013) ‘Psychogeography and feminist methodology.’ Feminism & Psychology, 23(3), pp.285–298.

Cresswell, T. (2004). Place: a short introduction . Hoboken: Blackwell Publishing.

Nutsford, D., Pearson, A.L. & Kingham, S. (2013) ‘An ecological study investigating the association between access to urban green space and mental health.’ Public Health, 127(11), pp.1005–1011.

Pink, S. (2008) ‘An urban tour: The sensory sociality of ethnographic place-making.’ Ethnography , 9(2), pp.175-196.

The Bounty Walk: A Place to Remember

Emma Schofield

One of my earliest memories is of Cookham Cemetery with all my family and closest family friends. I remember my godmother’s curly auburn hair whilst she cried into the shoulder of her husband, my dad’s best friend. I stepped forward as I threw the last bouquet of flowers into the grave before the soil began to be shovelled onto the coffin. When I was four, my dad passed away from skin cancer. Me, my mum and my eight-month old sister were left, supported by our amazing family and friends. When reflecting upon places of meaning, Cookham cemetery seemed a place which should be valued of utmost importance to me, considering the significance of this memory and the social connotation of cemeteries as places in which people visit to remember loved ones. Academics suggest that memories of an event interlock with space to generate a place’s emotional significance (Cresswell, 2004; Casey, 1996). However, rather than considering the cemetery as a particularly meaningful place to me, I was struck by the bizarre yet familiar recognition of very minimal feelings towards it. The following journal will provide a contrast between two places of meaning or ‘landscapes’ (Gusman and Vargas, 2011; Stevenson, 2014); firstly, a socially assumed place of remembrance, the cemetery, and secondly a place which I feel elicits stronger personal connotations and heightens a feeling of closeness to my dad, The Bounty Walk.

A cemetery is widely recognised as a place of significant social meaning and remembrance, particularly for those who have lost a loved one. Michell Foucault first referred to the cemetery as a heterotopia; an ambiguous, disturbing, contradictory space which holds layers of meaning (Foucault, 1967), which ‘somehow mirror and at the same time distort, unsettle or invert other spaces’ (Johnson, 2013: 790-791). Academics report that the cemetery holds many paradoxical connotations; it is both a collective and private place; a place of both presence and absence; a place of both the mundane and the extraordinary; and a place which simultaneously represents the past, the present and the future (Johnson, 2012). Following my dad’s death, Cookham cemetery became a place that we would regularly go to tend to the flowers and visit my dad’s grave. With my sister and I being so young when our dad passed, the cemetery was a place where our mum could attempt to bring us closer to our dad and gently explain death. Francis et al. (2005) describe the cemetery as a place which represents part of the grieving process. Whilst being a private place for reflection it is also a social space which supports communication (Gusman and Vargas, 2011). There is much academic research which depicts cemeteries as ambivalent yet highly emotive places (Clements, 2017; Gusman and Vargas, 2011). However, throughout my life, upon visiting the cemetery, I have always felt conflicted – rather than evoking feelings of closeness to my dad, or even sadness at his loss, the cemetery remains a very neutral place to me. Albeit, I have always felt as though it should mean more.

Nowadays, I do not regularly visit the cemetery, nor do my sister or Mum, however when I do, rather than being moved by any deep emotion, I am struck by relatively mundane thoughts. I have feelings of guilt if the grave is overgrown and does not appear tended to, not for the sake of my dad’s memory, or even for my family and friends, but for how the grave may appear to other people visiting the cemetery. Studies depict cemeteries as representative of a domestic environment, similar to a garden (Clements, 2017; Johnson, 2012; Gusman and Vargas, 2011). Individuals regularly tend to the graves of loved ones, personalising them in the memory of those lost. Some report this to be a cathartic process, enabling the evoking and management of grief (Johnson, 2012) whilst others depict this behaviour as a social duty or a social performance, producing a self-representation which values the connotations of a well-tended grave (Gusman and Vargas, 2011). The perfectly tended graves socially represent personal places for individuals who see the cemetery as a meaningful site of remembrance in which they can feel close to, or pay their respects to, lost loved ones. The cemetery, however, has never been that for me. I can’t deny that in dark times I have strongly wanted it to feel that way and have visited my dad’s grave in the hope of feeling some deeper emotions. Whether it is my lack of religiosity or the feeling of lifelessness in a cemetery that cause me to feel this way, I can’t be sure. Gusman and Vargas (2011) propose a weakening of collective ritualistic discourses and attitudes around death and suggest that new generations may find these narratives difficult to associate with. Thus, alternative meaningful places and individualised demonstrations of memory can be located away from the cemetery. Cookham cemetery is a peaceful place but there are places in my life which hold deeper connotations and a multitude of significant memories.

A place that evokes particular feelings of closeness to my dad is a walk in Cookham which runs along the side of the Thames to a small country pub on the river called the Bounty. It is fondly referred to in my family as ‘The Bounty Walk’. Stevenson (2014:3) depicts memory as an “embodied, multi-sensory phenomenon” which is intertwined with emplaced actions such as walking. Whilst I have no memories of being with my dad in this place, it is a walk that I have done countless times with family, friends and boyfriends, and carries a lot of meaning to me. The walk is striking in every season; on a bright summer’s day, a grey October afternoon or a frosty winter morning, and I have had many conversations about my dad on this walk. My mum also considers it a very special place to her and somewhere she and my dad would frequently visit and create memories. Memory is portrayed as a collective and collaborative experience (Stevenson, 2014), with the geographical landscapes having a direct impact on the emotions and behaviour of individuals (Debord, 1955). Stevenson (2014) reports that through walking, we heighten the experience of being in a place by following routes which have been embedded with past meanings. I propose that through my own experiences and the memories of my dad, reported by my mum and family friends in this landscape, individual and collective memories have been developed which enable me to feel a sense of closeness to my dad in this place.

The Bounty Walk is a place which is full of life; dogs bound around with muddy paws and children paddle in the river with 99 flakes in hand from the ice cream van. It has rolling hills which look out over vast fields and villages whilst the flowing river Thames cuts through the landscape and the wind rustles in the trees. The fields are inhabited by a gang of confident cows, who, when feeling boisterous, chase passers-by and accompanying dogs to the wooden boundary gates. It is a meaningful and familiar place in which I have experienced many emotions (Richardson, 2015; Tuan, 1977). It evokes a plethora of vivid multi-sensory memories and represents a place which I have visited throughout my life in both happy and dark times. This characterises the complexities of remembering a loved one, my dad is remembered in a place which is full of life and change. The Bounty Walk brings people together and is beautiful regardless of the circumstances. My dad was a bubbly and vibrant man, maybe that is why the cemetery does not seem a fitting place to feel closeness towards him. However, The Bounty Walk will always remain a significant place to me, in which life can be enjoyed and reflected upon in all its many colours.

 

References

Casey, E, S. (1996) How to Get from Space to Place in a Fairly Short Stretch of Time: Phenomenological Prolegomena. Santa Fe: School of American Research Press.

Clements, P. (2017) ‘Highgate Cemetery Heterotopia: A Creative Counterpublic Space’. Space and Culture. 20(4) pp. 470-484.

Cresswell, T. (2004) Place: A Short Introduction. London: Blackwell.

Debord, G. (1955) ‘Introduction to a critique of urban geography.’ In Knabb, K. (ed.) Situationist International Anthology. Paris: Bureau of Public Secrets, p. 5.

Foucault, M. (1967, March). ‘Of other spaces: Utopias and heterotopias.’ Architecture/Mouvement/Continuité. [Online] [Accessed on 1st March 2019] http://web.mit.edu/allanmc/www/foucault1.pdf

Francis, D., Kellaher, L. and Neophytu, G. (2005) Secret Cemetery. London: Bloomsbury Publishing.

Gusman, A., and Vargas, C. (2011) ‘Body, Culture and Place: Towards an Anthropology of the Cemetery’, Academia. [Online] [Accessed on 1st March 2019] http://www.academia.edu/5744603/Body_Culture_and_Place_Towards_an_Anthropology_of_the_Cemetery

Johnson, P. (2012) ‘The cemetery: a highly heterotopian place’, Heterotopian Studies. [Online] [Accessed on 1st March 2019] http://www.heterotopiastudies.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/The-Cemetery-a-highly-heterotopian-space-pdf.pdf

Johnson, P. (2013) ‘The Geographies of Heterotopia’, Geography Compass, 7(11) pp. 790-803.

Richardson, T. (2015) Walking inside out: Contemporary British Psychogeography. 1st ed., New York: Rowman & Littlefield International.

Stevenson, A. (2014) ‘We Came Here to Remember: Using Participatory Sensory Ethnography to Explore Memory as Emplaced, Embodied Practice’, Qualitative Research in Psychology, 11(4) pp. 335-349.

Tuan, Y. (1977) Space and place: The perspective of experience. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

 

Cerebral and Rhizomatic Selves

Oscar Fitzpatrick

Against Interpellation

Much of what has been taught to us as students of psychology have been implicitly imposing a specific ontology of the self, an ontology of essentialist individualism that has become increasingly invasive in neoliberal societies (Rose, 1998). However, what has been opened to me through engagement in critical academia is not only a structure in which to understand how discourses normalise how our selves and actions are to be understood, but the courage to understand the world through alternative ontologies of the self. What I would like to establish then, over the course of these journal entries, are some “lines of flight” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1988): some conceptions of place and self as praxis, which disrupt the discourses which I feel interpellate us (Althusser, 2006) in our everyday conduct and in this process, limit us. Guided by a non-representational, rhizomatic conception of self, across these three entries, I protest against an essentialist individual ontology that has been established through the neurochemical self, through the spaces we inhabit, and through the digital technologies that are enmeshed in our social structures.

Cerebral/Individual

Through the discipline of neuropsychology, a cerebral subject has been established (Vidal, 2009). This cerebral subject is a product not of technological progress as we edge closer and closer to the truth of human kind, but the product of ideological projects of the self (Rose, 1992). With the authority of the scientific discipline, the neurochemical self presents the brain as a spectacle (DuBord, 2012). Through a dense interconnected biological majesty that is presented through psychological technologies (Rose, 1998), the neurochemical self is granted an authority over what the self is. What is lost (as a necessary consequence) through constructing the self as an essentialist entity is the loss of a rich aggregate  of relational qualities (Deleuze, 1988; Thrift, 2008); through the individualised notion of the self as a brain, a person is reduced to a mass of neurons, mysteriously orchestrating and orientating all aspects of personhood.

Through the technologies of the neuro discipline and an “implicit” interpellation (Althusser, 2006) towards individualisation, it has become possible to mend the self individually through the use of pharmaceuticals. Sadly, (but perhaps unsurprisingly) this process is a lucrative one, with antidepressants such as SSRI’s being estimated to be worth as much as $13.4 billion globally by 2018 (gbiresearch, 2019: online).

Presented under the authority of the neuro discipline, is an embodied essentialist self. A self that can be located: that is stable, classifiable, quantified and measured. What is external to the embodied brain is always filtered through it, and in that process; reduced (Platek et al, 2004). Emotions, places, social bonds and societal forces are transformed into neurological processes and biochemical reactions. Amongst other forms of power, the neurochemical self assumes a pastoral role for the individuals that it constructs (Foucault, 1982; pp 783).

The development of the cerebral self is not a new development, and may be understood in the context of the psy-disciplines history of pastoral power over the self since its emergence in the 18th and 19th centuries (Foucault, 1990; Hacking, 1986; Rose, 1998; Adamis et al, 2007). In the 20th century, it is through the psy disciplines that the concept of mental health is constructed and thus enabled (Rose, 1998). As a consequence of governing the self as a cerebral subject, it is now through the neuro discipline that the self is mended best.

Towards a Rhizomatic Self

Against a stifling view of the psychologised self, one may look to rhizomatic, or non-representational understandings of self (Deleuze & Guattari, 1988; Thrift, 2008). For Deleuze and Guattari, the self is multiple, non-subjectified and transient (Rose, 1998; pp 170). As opposed to constructing ourselves as subjects, things, or persons, we are invited to think of ourselves in terms of “haeccities”, and understand not as a single subject, but as multiple selves being made up of changing flows and narratives (Sermijn et al, 2008).

“You are a longitude and a latitude, a set of speeds and slownesses between unformed particles, a set of nonsubjectified affects. You have the individuality of a day, a year, a season, a life (regardless of its duration) – a climate, a wind, a fog, a swarm, a pack (regardless of its singularity). Or at least you can have it, you can reach it.” – (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988; pp. 162)

Embodying more than just grey matter, Deleuze and Guattari invite us to think of a self that is of constant flow and changing  affects: here our self may be more akin to a fog than a subject. For a neurochemical self, when an action it performed, it is performed by the agentic self, processed by a neurological centre towards an external object (Talavera, 2019). For the rhizomatic self, the self is contained in the action, it is the flow between the affects, it is the full and rich experience of each and every attribute that we experience. For Deleuze and Guattari (1988), these new ways of envisioning the self are crucial for “deterritorialising” those places, selves and forms that have become governed (or territorialised) through disciplines such as neuropsychology (Rose, 1998; pp 172). If we are to become free of those governing aspects that delineate our ontology  – i.e. who we might have been, may be and may become – new conceptions of self are crucial. For Deleuze and Guattari (1988), those discourses which govern our ontology are always in constant struggle with those that shut down our possibilities of being something other than that which is delineated.

Conclusion: Towards Transformative Ends

To this end, we may reach to imbue our discourses with transformative purpose. For the neuro-researcher, the self is a place for normalising aspects of biology to be unearthed; they are external subjects in their research. For a rhizomatic researcher (Clarke & Parsons, 2013), the act of researching is fundamentally tied into one’s own self, and findings are inescapably involved in historical and social context (Sermijn et al, 2008). Consequently, I have tried to write these journal entries towards what I see as transformative ends, with an aim to disrupt those discourses which construct and interpellate us as essentialist individual subjects, and attempt to address some of the alternative views of the self which I carry with me both in these entries, and in everyday experience.

References

Adamis, D., Treloar, A., Martin, F.C. and Macdonald, A.J., 2007. A brief review of the history of delirium as a mental disorder. History of Psychiatry, 18(4), pp.459-469.

Althusser, L., 2006. Ideology and ideological state apparatuses (notes towards an investigation). The anthropology of the state: A reader, 9(1), pp.86-98.

Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F., 1988. A thousand plateaus: Capitalism and schizophrenia. Bloomsbury Publishing.

Debord, G., 2012. Society of the Spectacle. Bread and Circuses Publishing.

Foucault, M., 1982. The subject and power. Critical inquiry, 8(4), pp.777-795.

Foucault, M., 1990. The history of sexuality: An introduction, volume I. Trans. Robert Hurley. New York: Vintage.

Gbiresearch (2012) Antidepressants Market to 2018 – Despite Safety Concerns, Selective Serotonin Re-uptake Inhibitors (SSRIs) Continue to Dominate in the Absence of Effective Therapeutic Alternatives [online] [2019] http://www.gbiresearch.com/report-store/market-reports/archive/antidepressants-market-to-2018-despite-safety-concerns-selective-serotonin-re-uptake-inhibitors-(ssris)-continue-to-dominate-

Hacking, I., 1986. Making up people.

Platek, S.M., Keenan, J.P., Gallup Jr, G.G. and Mohamed, F.B., 2004. Where am I? The neurological correlates of self and other. Cognitive Brain Research, 19(2), pp.114-122.

Rose, N., 1992. Governing the enterprising self. The values of the enterprise culture: The moral debate, pp.141-164.

Rose, N., 1998. Inventing our selves: Psychology, power, and personhood. Cambridge University Press.

Sermijn, J., Devlieger, P. and Loots, G., 2008. The narrative construction of the self: Selfhood as a rhizomatic story. Qualitative inquiry, 14(4), pp.632-650.

Talavera, G., 2019. Exposing the ‘neuro-creed’: histories of the present and the neuroscientific past.

Thrift, N., 2008. Non-representational theory: Space, politics, affect. Routledge.

Vidal, F., 2009. Brainhood, anthropological figure of modernity. History of the human sciences, 22(1), pp.5-36.

University: a Paradoxical Promise of World Class Professionalism?

Nosipho Akhona Bongephiwe Sithole

As I make the final stretch to the grand finale of my university career, I am naturally reflective on the whole experience. And some may perceive my stance and musings as cynical but I believe it to be mostly critical but also largely based on my experience which permits me to be somewhat bias. In addition, the beauty of experience is that it cannot be wrong. I believe that the neo-liberalist ideological society we live in imposes and pressurises young adults into believing university is the most logical and only conceivably acceptable option as the next step. Neo-liberalism can be understood as the hegemonic and dominant social and political state that indoctrinates the west (Harvey as cited by Saunders, 2010). The shift being from the previously popular and collectivised welfare state to individualised citizens who become ‘autonomous economic actors’; a society in favour of privatisation, commodification and marketization (Whitehead and Crawshaw, 2012; Harvey, 2005). And despite of the subsequent rise of inequality, the power shifting to multinational corporations and financial institutions (the elite) and the exponential growth of personal debt- this ideology still has a stronghold over western cultures (Dumenil and Levy as cited by Saunders, 2010).

This has undoubtedly had an impact on higher education and university institutions. This has resulted in an alignment of neoliberal ideologies with the ‘economics, structures, and purpose of higher education’, affecting the students and faculty priorities (Saunders, 2010). Moreover, with the rise of neoliberalism there has been a parallel growth in student applicants. The year I applied saw an increase of 3.1% (16,100) applicants amongst the UK population, following the previous year (UCAS, 2015). I distinctly remember being in sixth form, having barely adjusted to the shift from GCSE’s and there was already the subtle suggestions of university and prep for writing personal statements. By my second year of A Levels, they were militantly enforcing all students to write personal statements and throttling prospectuses down our throats. Along with the pressures of staying on top of the work, we had to make time to travel the country, going to open days and deciding whether we would want to invest three years of our lives in these glorified institutions. My housemate expressed to me how everyone in her sixth form was made to write a personal statement. I remember the way in which our sixth form leader would refer to those who had chosen not to attend sixth form, and instead had pursued college and apprenticeships, as if they were settling. And how students, who chose to not apply, were marginalised and were not nurtured or given the same care and attention as they were not fulfilling the highly favoured quota. If you were not coerced into applying, in the eyes of the sixth form, you shifted into the periphery. That in itself is a very dangerous notion to implement on young adults; the feeling of failure, if you do not make the grades required for university or being devalued, if you simply do not aspire to enter higher education.

I decided to re-jog my memory and looked at what was being prophesised in various university prospectuses. There is an undeniable promise and sales pitch of what young adults should expect university to be;

For every astronaut, fire fighter, gold medal winners and entrepreneurs, there are millions who grew up and settled for plan b

There are those happy to stand back and see how that page will be filled And then there are others- the ones clutching their pens and their brushes. That’s us, and that’s you’ (Manchester Metropolitan University, 2019)

These are just two excerpts but already the notion ‘settled for plan b’ has supported my musings, there is a clear suggestion that there is a belief in the essentialism of university. A narrative spoken and perpetuated by the institutions who have been indoctrinated by the neo-liberal ideology. For it is ideology that allows power politics to become seemingly an essential and stringent component of human interactions; of social and economic environments (DeMarrais et al, 1996). In addition, these quotes have succeeded in drawing a line and marginalising those who do not strive for university. In a way that makes those seem like deviants. When one of the greatest likelihoods, that should be considered, is that where before the right to higher education was a man’s right- a feminist issue- it has now shifted into a socio-economic/ class issue. In simpler terms, whether individuals can even afford to go to university; afford to entertain the idea of even applying. And with the rise of austerity and increased tuition fees, it is not surprising that individuals would be hesitant to embark on an experience that is financially not feasible. Saunders states that the system has always served the interests of capital and the ruling class (2010). When I was decided to go to university I understood that I would be walking into debt and what was most worrying about this fact was that this seemed to be the norm, it did not unsettle me because so many were, had and would be going through the same thing. Right here is a clear example of how we, liquid moderns, have been interpellated within our ideological states. Liquid Moderns are the products of the neoliberal societal state, entered at the end of the 20th century (Bauman, 2000). The interpellation occurring here, is the proposed process of young adults internalising and identifying their social and subject roles as undergraduates and whatever comes with that role, whether it be negative or positive. Althusser theorised it as, ‘capitalism brings forth a subject form”; a subject who, assuming his subjection, takes on its guilt’ (Bidet, 2017 pg. 63). We are being hailed into applying into higher education.

The Unfolding Paradoxical Pedagogy

I make the cut, securing the grades to enter the land of academic milk and honey, with my hands held out in supplication. Initially, due to being a novice and the newness of it all, I fool myself into thinking that this was great, I am enthusiastic and even make the effort with my attendance and engagement with what I am learning. The irony of it all was in our first year we were made to investigate the shift for students into higher education. And reading it back now, I definitely was naïve, going as far as accusing students who dropped out or did not arise to the challenges as having not prepared themselves adequately, that they had been ‘laissez-faire’. Little did I know, or simply did not realise, that for many they were sold something far greater than what was received. Nevertheless, I was soon about to be made aware. What has now been illuminated to me from that assignment, is the lack of wider criticism I bore; but even more interestingly is that scholars who have also investigated this shift into higher education rarely attribute the resulting interactions of the students and the university as being intertwined and affected by the rising dominant neoliberal ideology (Saunders, 2010).

Education at Birmingham is a genuine partnership and this is reflected in our focus on ensuring you develop the skills needed to stand out in a competitive job market, whichever career you go on to choose’ – (University of Birmingham, 2018)

you’ll experience an education and environment that sets you on the right path to a professionally rewarding and personally fulfilling future. Be inspired by world-leading projects, make global connections and develop your talents. Choose Manchester and we’ll help you make your mark.’ (University of Manchester, 2018)

Although these two extracts are from different universities, consensually amongst all universities, there is that delightful promise of inspirational and world class teaching that, in the end should deliver world-class professionals. University is an imagined landscape of ‘academic freedom’, with the goal to inspire intellectual and impassioned students. This was a statement from a friend and recent Manchester University dropout, he states his experience with the university ‘failed miserably and a horror show ensued.’ In addition, he goes on to say, ‘Lectures were uninspiring. Curriculums were designed not to provoke original thought but to be marked quickly and effortlessly.’. Considering he was a hard-working, driven computer science and mathematics undergrad, in his last year, something must have went amiss for him to drop it all. My experience, I believe is not significantly different from many other peoples; I came into university with great expectations socially, academically, with a naïve curiosity and fresh drive. However, by the second year, the disillusionment had turned into an established disheartened version of that very same person. The course had quickly fallen short of what I had been so greatly looking forward to. For first two years, I we were subjected to compulsory units that were pretty much building on from what I had studied in A-Levels. It was as if, what we had been taught in A levels was the beginner level and we were forcibly progressing through the levels finally ending at advanced. But the catch was, the knowledge was all the same, reciting the same old traditional psychological theories as if they were biblical; parables that I had have to recite every night so I could receive the holy communion and make it to the promised-land. In other words, tick all the boxes, pass my assignments and examinations and finally graduate.

It truly felt as though I was being taught how to regurgitate with greater understanding, with increasing and wider references. This failed to inspire any passion, within me, to be intellectually innovative and incentivised. I was being taught discipline. I grew further resentful and dis-impassioned. I felt as though I was going through the paces, completing assignments and exams to a standard that would get me to the next stage. One-step closer to that sweet piece of paper on graduation day, from the face of the university who up until that moment I would not have had any idea who they were. The elusive validator. In this sense you could say the ‘genuine partnership’ Birmingham University offers, was true, as I grew to anticipate what my master, I mean marker, expected from me. In fact, the reality of what I actually got, and what so many of us get, is the master-slave dialectic. This can be understood as the hegemonic pedagogy inflicted upon most students in higher education, where the master (lecturer) see’s the slave (student) as a vessel to be filled with their superior knowledge within the rigid, ‘bureaucratic codes’ (Langer et al, 2018). This approach to teaching I strongly believe lead me to adopting, what Sarah Mann proposed to be the surface approach to learning, meaning I was grossly apathetic and passive towards my learning; but simultaneously taking on the strategic approach,  and feeling the pressure of still having to make my deadlines and complete examinations (Langer et al, 2018). The neoliberal state of the university is guilty of treating the student as a customer, instead of an apprentice to work in collaboration with. The institutions ideology has dehumanised the learning experience. The Master- Slave dynamic supressed and stifled within me my objet a before I even had the chance to discover what it was, to find what it was that made me tick academically. It is admittedly heart breaking and terrifying to think I could have walked away from university having internalised and accepted this, to be exemplary lecturing.

It was only in third year, after we were gracefully but unpunctually bestowed with the choice of picking our own units, that I was finally able to be critical of Psychology but also engage in topics that truly interested me. It created a fire in me that challenged the meticulously constructed notions of what it was that I thought Psychology to be and, most reassuringly, challenged what I had learnt to accept as teaching. It is not to say that all university courses are similar to this but this seemed to be the case for me, and a few other peers who I have vented to, and with. Continually, it is not to say that there were not moments of excitement and sparked embers of curiosity. It just calls into question, the issue of whether it was enough to justify the sheer amount of investment made by me into the university.

Mental Health among the Apprentices. 

University is not just an institution where you learn, it also involves confronting other aspects of emerging adulthood: finding independence and freedom but also creating a new social safety net. And for some, the experience is not plain sailing. Along with feeling deflated with what I was learning and the style in which it was taught, I also unfortunately developed anxiety and depression and a lot of that was due to choices I made in my social life. However, I cannot ignore that the hopelessness I felt from my learning environment did not help. Because of my freedom and things that were made readily available to me, due to my social surroundings, taking recreational drugs became something of the norm and- at the lowest point- a reliance. Nothing seemed to stimulate me academically so I wonder if that was one of the many reasons it became so easy to give in to the appeal of drugs, was it being reinforced by the presence of instant gratification.

Mental health issues are greatly prevalent amongst students. Five times as many students as 10 years ago, are likely to come forward with their afflictions, however this may be due to the decrease in stigma (Raddi, 2019). But a survey on 1,093 students, by NUS, reported that half of their sample size experienced some form of mental health issue but did not seek support (Gil, 2015). It is also reported that as many as one in four students will suffer with mental health issues, the number of students dropping out has also trebled and there is a devastating exponential rate of suicides in recent years (Raddi, 2019). I fall under the category of students who suffer but never seek help, and for whatever reason I was able to stop it from swallowing me completely, although there was definitely a point where I was drowning. In one of the many articles covering student mental health, a student effectively states one of the issues that can be seen as a cause of the rising phenomena, is that we are told university will be some of the “best years of your life”, and there is an undoubtable pressure and expectation to live up to that (Gil, 2015). I wholly agree with this, I was attempting to balance a well-rounded and active social life, beginning to realise that I was taking a passive interest in my studies, whilst still stressing over the demanding nature of my studies. It feels like you have to save face and keep up with your peers, who are probably experiencing the exact same thing. An opinion piece I recently read, touches on the new and unrecognised phenomena of ‘millennial burnout’, believed to be, ‘brought on by “over-expectations from parents, careers, and society”’ and further goes on to illuminate how the presence of social media creates a wider threat, due to ‘the constant pressure to be living your best life’(BBC, 2019). I think the neoliberal society we live in creates this overly-connected but similarly individualised sphere that leaves people feeling isolated and in competition with each other. Sociologist, Will Davies argues that the encouraged competitiveness of neo-liberalism, makes it possible to ‘discern who and what is valuable’ (Metcalf, 2018). In addition, I think students are aware of the competitive society we live in and despite the mediocrity and oversold pedagogy offered by universities, they take on the brunt of it all. I speculate, just to keep up with the rat race, and in my case to overcome the dissonance, I had/ have to tell myself it is all going to be worth something. We understand that neo-liberalism does not empathise or wait for those falling behind.

A Degree and Then What?

So now I am looking back on my experience, in the final hour and yes the experience has not been wholly disastrous but I am walking away with marks, my battle scars; mentally and financially but I am desperately hoping it was not some futile war. Whilst working part-time in a supermarket, I learnt you are held liable for any misleading or deceptive sales, I think universities should also be held liable for what they sell to young adults. The promise of prosperity after graduation should be carefully considered, the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) found that the top 10% of male graduates earn £170,000 annually, the median earning £40,000, whilst the graduates at the bottom end are not guaranteed graduate jobs (The Conversation, 2016). Going on further to publish that it was graduates from higher-income families with students attending the top universities that gained greater earnings, compared to low-income households. Continually, there was an increase in men with high earnings than woman. This illustrates that yes, higher education matters but ‘the labour market seems not to be entirely meritocratic’ and as I argued before there is a favourable nature for capital and the ruling class (The Conversation; 2016; Saunders 2010).

In hindsight, I wish when I was 16/17 years old, that I had been given the option to really take my time with making my choice. I wish that the people responsible for offering me my future had nourished and allowed the consideration of the other venues possible for someone my age, for instance, going to College, applying for an apprenticeship, working and experiencing the real world. I wish that the notion of acquiring knowledge and experiencing the world was not only made feasible by endeavouring to become a graduate. That there is not an enforced notion on young adults that the only way to achieve a good standard of living and quality of life is by getting a degree and a graduate job. Lastly, for those embarking on the journey, that they be sold the truth. And that once you get your degree, it does not certify anything and that there will be new existential threats to face.

To surmise on a positive note, I did find my objet a; to apply critical thinking within and beyond higher education. Author Bell Hooks articulates it so well,

without the capacity to think critically about our selves and our lives, none of us would be able to move forward, to change, to grow.’ (2014)

If society and the university adopted this as well, I believe they would create these world class professionals they proposition to do. Critical thinking extends to anyone, it is not only exclusive to those who go to university, it should not to be seen as a privilege.

 

References

Bauman, Z. (2000). Liquid Modernity. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Polity Press

BBC Three (2019) How it Feels to Have ‘Millennial Burnout’. 27th February. [Online] [Accessed 1st March 2019) https://www.bbc.co.uk/bbcthree/article/c384d54a-0116-437f-83e8-ddbca65b6c06

Bidet, J. (2017) The Interpellated Subject: Beyond Althusser and Butler. Marxismes Ecologiques. Vol. 1, Iss. 61, pp, 184-201.

DeMarrais, E., Castillo, L, J. & Earle, T. (1996) Ideology, Materialization and Power Strategies. Current Anthropology. Vol. 37 Iss.1, pp. 15-31.

Gill, N. (2015) Majority of Students Experience Mental Health Issues, says NUS Survey. The Guardian. [Online] 14th December 2015. [Accessed 1st March 2019]. https://www.theguardian.com/education/2015/dec/14/majority-of-students-experience-mental-health-issues-says-nus-survey

Harvey, D. (2005). A Brief History of Neoliberalism. New York: Oxford University Press.

Hooks, B. (1994) Teaching to Transgress: Education as the Practice of Freedom. New York. London. Routledge.

Langer, S., Bunn, G., & Fellows, N. (2018) Towards a Psychosocial Pedagogy: The ‘Student Journey’, Intersubjectivity, and the Development of Agency. Centre for Excellence in Learning and Teaching.

Metcalf, S. (2017) Neoliberalism: the idea that swallowed the world. The Guardian. [Online] 18th August. [Accessed on the 28th February 2019]. https://www.theguardian.com/news/2017/aug/18/neoliberalism-the-idea-that-changed-the-world

Rivkin, J. & Ryan, M. (2004) Literary Theory: an Anthology. 2nd Edition. Oxford. Blackwell Publishing.

Raddi, G. (2019) Universities and the NHS Must Join Forces to Boost Student Mental Health. The Guardian. [Online] 15th February 2019. [Accessed 1st March 2019] https://www.theguardian.com/education/2019/feb/15/universities-and-the-nhs-must-join-forces-to-boost-student-mental-health

Saunders, D. (2010). Neoliberal Ideology and Public Higher Education in the United States. Journal for Critical Education Policy Studies. Vol.8 Iss.1, pp. 41-77

The Conversation. (2016) What Your Choice of Degree Means for your Future Earnings. 13th April. [Online] [Accessed 2nd March 2019] http://theconversation.com/what-your-choice-of-degree-means-for-your-future-earnings-57760

University of Birmingham (2019) Undergraduate Prospectus 2020. Date published not applicable. [Online] [Accessed 27th February 2019] https://www.birmingham.ac.uk/Documents/students/undergraduate-prospectus.pdf

University of Manchester (2019) Undergraduate Prospectus 2020. Date published not applicable. [Online] [Accessed 27th February] https://www.manchester.ac.uk/study/undergraduate/prospectus/

Whitehead, P. & Crawshaw, P. (2012) Organising Neoliberalism: Markets, Privatisation and Justice. London and New York: Anthem Press.